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Facing Computing as Technique: towards a History and Philosophy of Computing
An essential  role  of  philosophy  has  always  been  to  investigate,  reflect  upon  and
contextualize scientific research, its paradigms, and their results. Philosophy has acted as a
methodological criterion for the sciences, especially in the form of logical reasoning, since its
Aristotelian  formulation.  Later,  it  has  played  a  foundational  role  in  guiding  mathematical
research,  during  and  beyond  the  Grundlagenkrisis  of  the  XXth  century.  This  process  is
well-known to us today in modern epistemology, with the various incarnations of philosophy
as reflection  about  physics,  biology, engineering,  to  name the most  common ones.  Each
scientific field presents to philosophy its own range of challenges and offers ways forward in
philosophical thinking itself. Famous examples are the “paradoxes” of quantum physics and
the large philosophical reflection on causality, inspired by the natural sciences. Along with the
methodological and foundational role played by philosophy, contextualizing and historicizing
scientific research is an essential task for its understanding. Indeed, as has been pointed out
by Lakatos, paraphrasing Kant, “Philosophy of science without history of science is empty”.1
Failing to acknowledge the historical  development of science(s) and ignoring the rich and
fluctuating content of scientific progress leads to a production of abstract classification criteria,
bearing little or no relation at all to how science develops in reality. Conversely, as Lakatos
continues, “history of science without  philosophy of science is blind”.  Merely studying the
history of science as history will only tell us about the facts of the history, but will not put us in
the position of understanding and anticipating future scenarios. In such combined historical
and philosophical landscape of the study of the sciences, computation and its incarnation, the
computer, have represented a real game-changer. The concurrent development of conceptual
and diachronic analysis towards the sciences is much needed in the context of computing,
with its short but complex history and its fundamental philosophical questions, which are far
from being solved and depend on the evolution of what computation is now, and can be later
at the theoretical and technological level. 
This combination of historical and philosophical research forms the methodological basis
for  the  activities  of  the   DHST2 commission  for  the  History  and  Philosophy  of  Computing
(HaPoC), an organization which is responsible, amongst others, for overseeing the organization
of the HaPoC conference series3. This special issue collects five papers that resulted from the
first of these conferences, held from 7-10 November 2011 at Ghent University, Belgium. The
aims of this conference series and the HaPoC commission in general are rooted in the certainty
that we are not only in need of deep historical and philosophical reflection on computing, but
that  any  such  reflection  needs  to  be  an  open  discussion  among  computer  scientists,
mathematicians, engineers, logicians and any other community involved in computing.
1 Lakatos, I. (1970), History of Science and its rational reconstructions, Proceedings of the Biennial 
Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 91-136.
2 DHST is the Division for the History of Science and Technology of the International Union for the 
history and philosophy of science. 
3 See www.hapoc.org for more details
Computing has revolutionized scientific research itself. The way to construct hypotheses,
create  models,  test  them  and  formulate  theories  has  been  re-defined  entirely  in  view  of
computational  systems  and  methods,  with  our  capabilities  being  pushed  more  and  more
forward. The recent impressive simulation of 20-years evolution of the Universe is a very clear
example  of  such  progress.4 But  the  evolution  cannot  be  put  simply  in  terms  of  brute
computational  force:  computing  is  in  many  ways  suggesting  a  ground,  albeit  not  yet  fully
understood, methodological shift. As an example, consider the current trend in data analytics:
there  is  no  formal  property  of  scientific  models  that  cannot  be  revealed  by  sufficient  data
classification, accompanied by a decent set of association rules, able to predict transformation
and induce relevant clustering5.  A theoretical  change of such proportions is possibly already
inducing  a  new  revolution  of  the  Kuhnian  kind,  one  that  will  need  sufficient  philosophical
reflection.
Moreover, the  computer  has  not  remained  confined to the laboratory. Rather, it  has
become an omnipresent object in our society and, along with it,  computation has become a
dominant  technique:  the variety of applications,  and how we depend on them, are multiple.
From one of its first applications onwards -- making computations to develop the H-bomb -- it
was clear that the effects of computing machinery were certainly not  restricted to scientific
research, resulting in a technology that affects every man in the street. For this reason, within a
relatively short period of time computing has become an area of philosophical interest, not only
for its relevance to science,  but also from the human perspective. Computing as ubiquitous
technique has become a full-fledged philosophical topic. As such, computing represents the last
formulation  of  a  long-standing  tradition  of  analyses  on  the  notion  of
techné/technique/technology.  One  important  source  in  this  context  is  Martin  Heidegger’s
analysis of “technique”, expressing the way we act in and perceive of the world.6 This work is
often interpreted as  a  critique  on  the “technification”  of  modern society, but  it  can also  be
understood as an appeal to man to become aware of the way perception and action in and with
the world are possible. In this interpretation of "technique", computation becomes the dominant
technique in our current society and computing devices represent its physical realization. In the
context of the computational society, therefore, the above reflection suggests that, in order to
understand "technique", it  is essential that we do not reduce ourselves to mere "users" of a
computational "instrument", but that we actively attempt at understanding what we are using,
how we are  using  it  and  how it  functions.  This  is  the  only  route  to  become aware  of  the
4 See: M. Vogelsberger et al (2014), Properties of galaxies reproduced by hydrodynamic simulation, 
Nature, vol. 509, pp. 177-182.
5 This strong assumption drives the research areas of data mining and big data analytics, although not 
necessarily taken with its full methodological implications: “[D]ata mining is the process of discovering 
interesting knowledge from large amounts of data stored in databases, data warehouses, or other 
information repositories. [...] By performing data mining, interesting knowledge, regularities, or 
high-level information can be extracted from databases and viewed or browsed from different angles. 
[…] . [D]ata mining is considered one of the most important frontiers in database and information 
systems and one of the most promising interdisciplinary developments in the information technology.” 
[Han, J. and Kamber, M., Data Mining – Concepts and Techniques, Elsevier, 2006.]
6 M. Heidegger (1954), Die Frage nach der Technik, in: M. Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, Verlag 
Günther Neske.
epistemological window through which we perceive, interact and construct our world and hence
stop it from being an epistemological obstacle.
 From this  perspective,  the  complex  of  relations  between  humans  and  computations
remains a crucial cultural issue in need of reflection. Such reflection becomes even more critical
in the face of the multi-layered structure of computing: 
• as a discipline that develops and investigates computing devices, computing is the study
of technological artefacts and the ``phenomena'' that surround them; 
• as a study of algorithms, it is a mathematical discipline; 
• and as a study of procedures, it is a natural science that defines its own subject matter
(as opposed to other natural sciences whose subject is external and given). 
This variety of aspects, to be taken inclusively, qualifies the above issue of “technique” as an
epistemological obstacle in a unique way: computing imposes not just knowledge of its use, but
also knowledge of this diversity of forms. While use is certainly a step towards knowledge (as
the essential divide between digital natives and digital analphabets illustrates), manipulation and
creation constitute an entirely different level of interaction with technology and requires another
kind of understanding. The fact that the majority of mankind uses many of the possibilities of the
computer, without  ever knowing what is beyond the interface they are offered and that has
developed historically in a certain monolithic development system, is just one concrete example
of this problem. Indeed, the only reason for this type of monopoly being possible is the fact that
most of the people never get beyond their graphic user interface. This form of "unaware user" is
obviously  also  the  result  of  a  historical  process,  rooted,  amongst  tohers,  in  the  leap  from
low-level machine codes to symbolic assembly language to high-level languages and structured
and object-oriented programming.  The problem is certainly  not   per se this  development of
multiple, increasingly more productive, levels of abstraction. The problem is, rather, that as soon
as these levels induce forgetfulness about what lies beyond a certain level of abstraction, one
gives away the control, not to the “instrument”, but to the bureaucracy that actively promotes
this forgetfulness.
    
This  brief  analysis  has  essentially  two core  points.  First,  there  is  a  sense in  which
computing inherits today the essential role that  techne and technique have played in previous
eras, and with it comes a bundle of fundamental questions concerning its relation to humans
and the need for acknowledging and understanding it as a way to access and act in the world.
Secondly, for  its own nature,  computing and the computer are multi-layered and profoundly
multi-structured, and the result of a combination of hardware, language, abstraction, modeling,
interaction etc: this essential  feature of computing is made even more relevant by the drive
towards more efficient and faster ways of defining and using computational process in order to
satisfy our needs. It has also generated the forgetfulness we have hinted at before. It is exactly
the combination of these two points, computing as a hidden, multi-faceted technique, that forms
the main drive behind HaPoC: we are committed to opening up this technique through historical
and philosophical reflection. How can we, for instance, expect to unravel the complex relation
between humans and computation without paying attention to its rich development in history?
Conversely, how can we expect  to understand the evolution of,  for  instance, the method of
levels of abstraction, without taking into account the very idea of abstraction in computing as a
practice and as a philosophical concept?  
    
However, in order to offer such critical reflection on computing, our analysis also shows
the need for an understanding of its "technical" aspects. While requiring that everyone becomes
a kind of omniscient computer scientist is a fairly unrealistic and possibly unnecessary approach
to the problem, the role of historical and philosophical reflection cannot avoid to put this issue at
the front-line of its critical reflection about computing: this requires not only acute awareness of
the sociological, political, anthropological problems surrounding computing. It also imposes to
the philosopher and the historian a willingness and ability to master the technical details that are
at the root of this technique, be they mathematical abstraction, logical structure or engineering
patterns. We are strongly convinced that tackling the multiple fundamental and philosophical
problems arising within computing can only succeed if one also gives space to the developing
techniques that underpin the concept. From this perspective, answering the question “What is
computation?” becomes impossible without being open to the technological and formal practices
that have historically shaped and are continuously redefining the technique. We consider the
promotion of a combined historical and philosophical reflection on computational techniques as
a  true  challenge  for  the  humanities  to  engage  with  the  philosophical  issues  and  historical
evolution  of  computing  in  its  multiple  contexts,  from  the  foundations  of  computing  to  the
engineering practices. It is for this reason that, from the first conference onwards, HaPoC has
been  conceived  as  a  truly  interdisciplinary  conference,  viz.  not  only  a  meeting  by  and  for
historians and philosophers, but also as a venue for mathematicians, logicians, programmers,
artists,  sociologists  etc.  Our  aim is  to  create the open platform needed to accommodate a
fundamental reflection on computing that includes all  of its facets and where each discipline
contributes to the shaping of  the research questions leading other disciplines.  We are very
happy to see that each of the papers of this volume reflects precisely this attitude of conceptual
and technical precision, along with an openness towards the intersection of the distinct research
methods and problems that become intertwined in the computational sciences.
Federico Gobbo and Marco Benini start off this Special Issue with a contribution that
combines historical and philosophical analysis of technically-laden issues in computing. They
analyze  the  changing  relations  between  the  computer  and  its  “users”  throughout  its  short
history, showing how the evolution of modern computers has been shaped through abstraction.
More specifically, they rely on the methodology of levels of abstraction, which the Philosophy of
Information has inherited from Computer Science, to analyse the formal and structural relation
between operators,  programmer  and  user  by  way  of  a  categorical  model  (in  the  sense  of
category theory). The result is that the information flowing along categories is interpreted as a
structure-preserving entity and information hiding can be considered the main epistemic feature
of such structures. The model focuses on historical milestones of multi-tasking architectures,
presenting  abstractions  on  a  single  process,  the  OS,  the  von  Neumann  machine  model,
co-operative multi-tasking and network-distributed applications.
The  philosophical  openess  of  the  HaPoC  spirit  is  at  play  in  Sybille  Kraemer’s
contribution. She challenges the idea that computation is a non-sensual, purely formal kind of
operation, and connects it back to a material, linear spatialization of visual terms. She argues
that  a  technique  of  spatialization  has  been  crucial  in  representing  and  operating  with
non-spatial,  invisible objects of knowledge,  hence formalism and perceptivity do not oppose
each other but are intertwined. This philosophical take on calculation is contextualized in the
work  of  Descartes,  claimed  to  be  among  the  first  to  use  such  spatialized  formalism  as  a
figurative and operative writing of the mind.  In this way, the crucial problem of abstraction is
also echoed in this paper by questioning the relation between the abstract and the concrete,
through a study of work that goes back to a time when there were no computers in the modern
sense of the word.
Raymond Turner offers another perspective on the Philosophy of Computer Science, this
time with respect to the formal nature of programming languages. This analysis starts in the
formal nature of grammars, and then it follows the hybrid nature of its object, to explore their
abstract nature in the semantics, and their concrete one in the implementation by compilers.
This is a crucial and recurring theme in the philosophy of computing at large, the nature of which
is  partly  formal  science,  partly  engineering,  partly  language.  In  his  task,  which  takes  into
account  idealization,  correctness  and  intention  as  modes  of  the  ontology  appropriate  to
programming languages, Turner resorts to the comparison with the notion of technical artefact,
which  finds  its  origins  in  the  Philosophy  of  Technology,  and  has  already  highlighted  some
feature that are reproducible in this new endeavour: design, reproducibility, modifiability.
The multi-faceted nature of computing, already approached in the previous contribution,
returns in  a new version in the contribution by Viola  Schiaffonati  and Mario Verdicchio:  the
nature of computing from a methodological perspective, in particular related to computational
experiments, their role and structure. The authors consider the standard experimental method
from  traditional  scientific  disciplines,  and  reveal  how  the  strictly  innovative  and  rapid
development  of  computing  has,  on  the  one  hand,  hindered  the  applicability  of  a  similar
structured way of accounting for scientific hypotheses; and on the other, it makes it necessary to
improve on the accountability of computational results. They conclude with a plea for a more
historically aware approach in the development of such experimental strategies and for a more
intense  collaboration  of  philosophers  and  computer  scientists,  in  the  line  with  the  recent
development that the Philosophy of Technology has taken in its combination with Engineering.
One fundamental problem in computer science is the question: what does it mean to
compute?  Hector  Zenil  offers  a  very  interesting  answer  to  this  question  in  the  form  of  a
behavioural approach  in  terms  of  programmability  with  environment-reacting  as  its  main
property.  This approach has its roots in the definition of complexity as we find it in algorithmic
information theory and is applied to a wide variety of “devices”. This wide applicability is due to
the fact that the proposed definition is independent of a particular model. As such, it can be
applied both to natural  as well  as to artificial  systems and can thus be used as a broader
epistemological framework of computation which includes physical systems.
We believe HaPoC has created a platform of discussion and research relevant to all the
different areas of computing. We hope this Special Issue will represent a means for many to join
our  community  and  contribute  to  develop  a  new  level  of  understanding  of  the  computing
sciences.
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